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Arguments for the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) have been numerous ever 
since the fi rst countries broke its rules, and some 
have even argued for its abolition. The discussion 
on whether the uniform rules of the Pact are still ap-
propriate has been fuelled by the enlargement of the 
European Union by ten new Member States, leading 
to an EU that is considerably heterogeneous and eco-
nomically diversifi ed. In addition to the call for more 
fl exibility, experience has shown that countries do not 
behave prudently in good times, which indicates that 
the Pact is asymmetric in nature, not giving the right 
incentives to fi scal policy-makers during economic 
upswings. The problems of the SGP with respect to 
enforcement and implementation reached their pre-
liminary climax in November 2003 when the Council of 
Economics and Finance Ministers (Ecofi n) suspended 
a Commission recommendation to start sanction pro-
cedures against Germany and France – a decision that 
was annulled by the European Court of Justice in July 
2004. This Court ruling made a rethinking of the Pact’s 
rationale, rules and implementation unavoidable. As 
a reaction to the SGP’s problems in general and this 
Court ruling in particular, the European Commission 
published a Communication in September 2004 in 
which it presents proposals on how to enhance the 
effectiveness of the Pact’s rules. In March 2005, the 
Council of Ministers presented its own suggestions 
for a possible SGP reform in a report to the European 
Council.1 This report underlines the willingness of the 
Council to keep the Pact alive and unchanged in its 
rules-based approach and its basis of the two nominal 
anchors of 3% of GDP for the defi cit ratio and 60% 
for the debt ratio. According to the introduction to the 
Report, the proposals made aim at:
• strengthening and clarifying the implementation of 
the SGP;
• enhancing the economic underpinnings of the exist-
ing framework;
• better catering for differences between economic 
conditions in different Member States;
• keeping the rules as simple and transparent as pos-
sible.
Specifi cally, one of the declared goals of the sug-
gestions that are presented in the Report is “not to 
increase the rigidity or fl exibility of current rules but 
rather make them more effective”.2
The present paper contains a critical analysis of the 
ideas contained in the Report, accompanied by com-
parisons of the suggestions with earlier proposals for 
reform in the literature and the Commission Commu-
nication of September 2004. It will be argued that the 
Report does address some fundamental issues, espe-
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cially with regard to the correction of the pro-cyclical 
bias or the excessive uniformity of the rules. However, 
the proposals are insuffi cient to reform the SGP sat-
isfactorily, but rather stay on the “soft side” avoiding 
addressing core issues such as partisan enforcement 
and sanctions. 
The Council Report divides its proposals into three 
parts, namely improving governance, strengthening 
the preventive arm and improving the implementa-
tion of the Excessive Defi cit Procedure (EDP). In the 
following, the Council suggestions put forward in each 
of these parts will fi rst be briefl y presented and then 
commented on.
Improving Governance
The fi rst area in which the Council sees room for 
improvement is governance.3 Having affi rmed that the 
respective institutions involved in the SGP should “de-
liver on their respective responsibilities”4 and respect 
each other’s tasks, particularly the following points 
are mentioned to improve governance and national 
ownership:
(1) effective and timely cooperation and communica-
tion between the institutions and the public and 
between the institutions themselves;
(2) improved peer support and peer pressure based on 
a yearly assessment of national budgetary develop-
ments and their implications for the euro area as a 
whole;
(3) complementary national budgetary rules and insti-
tutions to enhance national ownership;
(4) a stability/convergence programme for the whole 
legislature when a new government has taken of-
fi ce, and furthermore a plea for continuity in that 
case with respect to the budgetary targets en-
dorsed by the Council;
(5) involvement of national parliaments in stability/
convergence programmes;
(6) reliable macroeconomic forecasts based on Com-
mission forecasts;
(7) enhanced quality, reliability and timeliness of fi scal 
statistics.
Improving governance surely is of certain relevance 
in reforming the SGP. The fact that the Council feels 
compelled to mention that the respective institutions 
involved in the SGP have to respect each other’s tasks 
is revealing in this respect, but not surprising given 
that one of the SGP’s more recent problems actually 
was that one institution (the Council) largely neglected 
another’s (the Commission’s) role as “guardian of the 
Treaty and its procedures”5 by not imposing the rec-
ommended sanctions on France and Germany despite 
their non-compliance with the rules of the SGP. But 
there is more to it: merely stating that Member States, 
the Commission and the Council have to respect 
each other’s responsibilities will not help to prevent a 
situation like the one of November 2003. Instead, as 
pointed out by Buti, Eijffi nger and Franco6 and Eijffi n-
ger7, in order to enhance non-partisan enforcement of 
the rules, the Commission would need more power in 
the decision on sanctions, e.g. by issuing proposals 
instead of recommendations to the Council. However, 
the Council Report clearly stresses that the institutions 
must deliver on their responsibilities while avoiding 
any institutional shift.8 It remains to be seen whether 
the Council would interpret a strengthened role of the 
Commission in imposing sanctions as an institutional 
shift or as the respecting of its role as guardian of the 
Treaty and its procedures.
In spite of the undeniable importance of governance 
for the effectiveness of the SGP, the question remains 
to what extent the issues put forward in the report will 
actually improve it. In fact, these issues can be divided 
into three groups. The fi rst group embraces point (1) 
and the general affi rmation of institutions having to 
deliver their respective responsibilities – it is basically 
a re-confi rmation of tasks and behavioural rules that 
should already have been clear anyway as inherent in 
the original Pact. As such, there is not much new to it 
and it is doubtful whether the mere statement of the 
need for improvement in these areas will really make 
a difference.
Points (2), (3), (4) and (5) constitute the second 
group – suggestions for which it is questionable 
whether improvements will really materialise. As Gros9 
states, peer support and peer pressure (2) for fi scal 
discipline, which according to the Council report is an 
“integral part of a reformed SGP”,10 have so far proven 
3 Council Report (2005), pp. 4-7.
4 Ibid., p. 4.
5 Ibid.
6 M. B u t i , S. E i j f f i n g e r, D. F r a n c o : Revisiting EMU’s Stabil-
ity Pact: A Pragmatic Way Forward, in: Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2003.
7 S. E i j f f i n g e r : Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact: Evaluat-
ing the European Commission’s Communication of September 2004, 
Briefi ng Paper for the Monetary Dialogue of the European Parliament 
with the President of the ECB, November 2004. 




ineffective.11 However, increased national ownership in 
the form of complementary budgetary rules and insti-
tutions (3) or more involvement of national parliaments 
in stability and convergence programmes (5) will not 
be a guarantee of improvement either in the light of 
the German experience. How much more can rules be 
nationally owned when they are already anchored in 
the Constitution of a country?12 In the German case, 
this clearly did not help to ensure compliance with the 
rules even though the budget and deviations from it 
have to be presented to and discussed in Parliament. 
Finally, with respect to (4), the Council merely invites 
new governments to show continuity and provide for 
a stability programme for the whole legislature, which 
is in the end just a plea for yet another political com-
mitment where neither compliance is rewarded nor 
non-compliance is punished. In sum, even if they are 
implemented as foreseen, one should be rather cau-
tious to expect suggestions (2)-(5) to deliver substan-
tial improvements in governance.
Finally, suggestions (6) and (7) denote useful ideas 
to improve the “SGP infrastructure”, that is, underly-
ing conditions that are crucial for the functioning of the 
Pact. In accordance with Eijffi nger,13 the importance of 
reliable macroeconomic forecasts (6) to prevent a “hid-
den undermining of the SGP”14 due to forecast errors 
is recognised. It can only be welcomed that the Coun-
cil Report gives a prominent role to the independent 
Commission forecasts in Member States’ projections 
and the assessment of their macroeconomic and 
budgetary developments. Following the Commission 
Communication of 3 September 2004, emphasis is 
also put on the quality, reliability and timeliness of 
fi scal statistics (7), which is an issue that the Council 
and the Commission are to deal with in more detail in 
the course of 2005. Especially if the provision of unreli-
able low-quality data is subject to sanctions, this will 
certainly increase the transparency of budgetary posi-
tions and enhance fi nancial markets’ ability to properly 
assess the creditworthiness of a Member State.
All in all however, the suggestions for improving gov-
ernance, which is desirable as such, are not convinc-
ing and to a large extent not straightforward enough to 
make much of a difference in practice. Except for the 
last two, they are guidelines and statements of intent 
heavily dependent on the good will of Member States 
rather than readily enforceable improvements. 
Strengthening the Preventive Arm
The second area that the Council Report on improv-
ing the working of the SGP deals with is a strengthened 
preventive arm,15 that is, the (renewed) commitment of 
Member States to budgetary consolidation in periods 
of growth above trend in order to avoid pro-cyclical 
policies and an excessive debt or defi cit level in bad 
times. Specifi cally, three points are put forward in this 
context.
(1) Differentiation of the medium-term budgetary ob-
jective (MTO) across Member States taking into 
account differences in the economic and budget-
ary situation of the countries: the MTO (in cycli-
cally adjusted terms, net of one-off and temporary 
measures) will be between -1% for low debt/high 
potential growth countries and balance or surplus 
for the high debt/low potential growth countries; 
implicit liabilities (especially those connected to 
the ageing of the population) should be taken into 
account as soon as criteria to deal with them ap-
propriately are established and agreed upon.
(2) Adjustment path to MTO: commitment to actively 
consolidate public fi nances in good times using 
unexpected extra revenues for defi cit and debt re-
duction, the benchmark for adjustment to the MTO 
being 0.5% of GDP annually; in case of non-com-
pliance, policy advice / early warnings (when the 
Draft Constitution is ratifi ed) are to be issued by the 
Commission.
(3) Structural reforms: major reforms with direct 
long-term cost-saving effects (especially pension 
reforms) are taken into account when assessing 
the adjustment path towards the MTO allowing 
for temporary deviations given that the 3% limit is 
respected and the budgetary position is expected 
to return to the MTO within the programme period.
Enhancing the commitment to fi scal discipline also 
in good times in order to tackle the asymmetric nature 
of the Pact has been demanded in the literature for a 
long time. Creating incentives to behave prudently in 
good times and thus correcting the pro-cyclical bias 
9 D. G ro s : Reforming the Stability Pact, in: INTERECONOMICS, Vol. 
40, No. 1, January/February 2005, pp.14-17.
10 Council Report (2005), p. 5.
11 D. G ro s , op. cit., p.17.
12 Article 110 (1) on Federal Budget and Budget Law of the German 
Basic Law states that: “… The budget shall be balanced with respect 
to revenues and expenditures.”
13 S. E i j f f i n g e r, op. cit.
14 S. E i j f f i n g e r, op. cit., p. 4.
15 Council Report (2005), pp. 8-11.
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by means of early warnings issued by the Commis-
sion has already been proposed by Buti, Eijffi nger 
and Franco16 and also reappeared in the Commission 
Communication of September 2004. In the light of 
this, the proposition on defi ning an adjustment path 
towards the MTO (2), which is – if necessary – accom-
panied by policy advice, is an overdue step in the right 
direction. Still, an annual adjustment of 0.5% of GDP 
is just a benchmark and it remains to be seen whether 
in practice some consistency will be noticeable on 
how much more than 0.5% should be corrected for 
in good times and how much less it may be when 
economic conditions are not that favourable, without 
letting full discretion in the strictness of its interpreta-
tion make this benchmark meaningless. Regarding the 
non-compliance with the prescribed adjustment path, 
a warning issued by the Commission is a more effec-
tive tool to create incentives to behave prudently than 
pure policy advice. However, for direct warnings to 
become feasible, one still needs to wait for the lengthy 
process of the ratifi cation of the Draft Constitution. 
Consequently, this improved mechanism cannot be 
expected to become effective in the very near future.
The other two points put forward by the Council 
address what Buti, Eijffi nger and Franco have identi-
fi ed as “excessive uniformity of the rules”.17 Mak-
ing the MTO dependent on the debt level, potential 
growth and eventually also implicit liabilities resulting 
from demographic changes (1) takes better account 
of country-specifi c differences in a European Union 
with increasingly heterogeneous Member States and 
rewards countries with relatively low debt levels and 
sustainable budgets, allowing them a less stringent 
MTO. In this point, the Council exactly follows the rea-
soning of the European Commission.18 Point (3) again 
concerns the adjustment path towards the MTO, al-
lowing for country-specifi c deviations when structural 
reforms with long-term cost-saving effects have been 
undertaken. In this way, it can be avoided that the im-
plementation of urgently needed reforms is delayed or 
given up in order to be able to follow a too stringent 
adjustment path.
In sum, it is fair to say that the improvements sug-
gested in the area of the “preventive arm” largely re-
spond to calls in the literature for more fl exibility/less 
uniformity of the rules and for earlier actions to correct 
inadequate budgetary developments. Nevertheless, it 
might be questioned whether warnings and commit-
ments to prudent behaviour in good times are effective 
given that they seem not to be working in bad times. 
Two points have to be mentioned in this respect (a 
third one will be stressed later on). On the one hand, 
good times provide more room for manoeuvre anyway 
as Member States face the “problem” of how to spend 
“unexpected extra revenue” for which no specifi c ex-
penditure plan exists, whereas in times of economic 
diffi culties, governments of Member States with an 
excessive defi cit (ED) would have to reallocate money 
that is already foreseen for other projects to debt and 
defi cit reduction, which is always more diffi cult. On the 
other hand, using unexpected extra revenue for defi cit 
and debt reduction leads to lower debt levels, which 
in turn is rewarded with a relaxed MTO and more fl ex-
ibility in government spending. As a result, the propos-
als put forward may indeed contribute substantially to 
correcting the pro-cyclical bias of the Pact.
Improving the Implementation of the EDP
Finally, the Council Report focuses on the clarifi -
cation of, and possible improvements in, the imple-
mentation of the Excessive Defi cit Procedure (EDP).19 
Issues dealt with include:
(1) the preparation of a Commission report on the ex-
istence of an ED;
(2) a widening of the defi nition of an “exceptional and 
temporary” ED over the reference value to cover all 
periods of negative growth and protracted periods 
of sluggish growth compared to potential growth;
(3) the clarifi cation of “all other relevant factors” taken 
into account when assessing the ED given it is 
temporary and close to the reference value, namely 
potential growth, prevailing cyclical conditions, 
policies to foster R&D and innovation, implementa-
tion of policies in the context of the Lisbon Agenda, 
fi scal consolidation efforts in good times, debt sus-
tainability, public investment and the overall quality 
of public fi nances; special consideration is given 
to possible high levels of fi nancial contributions to 
foster international solidarity and to achieving Euro-
pean policy goals (unifi cation of Europe);
(4) special attention to systemic pension reforms con-
sidering the net cost of the reforms for the initial fi ve 
16 M. B u t i , S. E i j f f i n g e r, D. F r a n c o , op. cit.
17 Ibid.
18 European Commission: Communication from the Commission to 
the Council and the European Parliament: Strengthening economic 
governance and clarifying the implementation of the Stability and 




years after introduction when assessing whether 
the ED has been corrected;
(5) the increasing focus on debt and sustainability 
through Council recommendations (issued in the 
framework of the Council opinion on the stability 
and convergence programmes) on debt dynamics 
for Member States above the reference values;
(6) the extension of deadlines for the adoption of deci-
sions and for taking effective action and measures 
in order for Member States to better frame actions 
on recommendations within the national budgetary 
procedure;
(7) the extension of the initial deadline for correcting an 
ED from 1 to 2 years conditional on special circum-
stances identifi ed, based on an overall assessment 
of “all other relevant factors” (see point (3));
(8) the revision of deadlines for correcting the ED in 
case of unexpected adverse economic events with 
major unfavourable budgetary effects occurring 
during the EDP.
Whereas (1) just reconfi rms the status quo stressing 
the Commission’s responsibility to prepare a report 
identifying whether an excessive defi cit exists and 
whether any exceptions apply that might make the 
launch of an EDP needless, the second group of is-
sues – points (2)-(5) – focuses on exceptions giving 
Member States the possibility to escape an EDP in 
spite of defi cits above the reference value. Points (6)-
(8) fi nally deal with the correction of excessive defi cits 
in the procedure, in particular with the deadlines pre-
scribed in the Pact. 
In both suggestions (2) and (5), the Council again 
closely follows proposals made by the European 
Commission20 strengthening the economic reasoning 
of the Pact. Especially the increased focus on debt 
and sustainability is of particular importance in ad-
dressing the demographic problem, which is probably 
not stressed enough given that the implicit debt stock 
is already two to three times higher than the offi cial 
debt stock in many EU Member States according to 
Hefeker.21 Turning to points (3) and (4), even though 
any clarifi cation of the term “all other relevant factors” 
is highly useful to limit the room for discretionary inter-
pretation of when an exception might be justifi ed and 
even though pension reforms may have a substantial 
impact on future budgetary developments, the diver-
sity of situations introduced that have to be taken into 
account when assessing a Member State’s defi cit is 
so broad that virtually every country with a temporary 
defi cit close to but above the reference value can fi nd 
a way to escape the EDP. This escape effectively rais-
es the reference value to whatever is in practice con-
sidered close enough to the original 3% to make the 
exceptions apply. However, if the MTO and prudent 
behaviour in good times were taken seriously, these 
“EDP-escape options” would not be necessary as the 
3% defi cit limit or, even more strictly, the 1% MTO limit 
and the adjustment path towards it leave enough room 
to fi nance policies such as the ones mentioned under 
(3). 
The envisaged extension of the various deadlines in 
the EDP is subject to considerations similar to those 
above. Introducing special circumstances under which 
the deadline for correcting an excessive defi cit is ex-
tended – points (7) and (8) – opens the door to abuse 
of this clause by re-interpreting conditions as special 
with the consequence of providing a legal possibility 
to escape sanctions even when the excessive defi cit is 
not corrected in time. Solely point (6), embracing inter 
alia the extension of the deadline (from 4 to 6 months) 
for the timing of taking effective action, is based on 
solid arguments. As the Council notes, extending this 
deadline allows Member States to better frame their 
action to correct an ED within the national budgetary 
procedure and to develop structural rather than tem-
poral measures.22 
In general, the Pact should be kept as simple and 
transparent as possible, thereby avoiding special 
provisions as much as possible. As Eijffi nger states, 
simplicity should be given up “if and only if at the same 
time not only fl exibility but also effectiveness through 
better enforcement of the Pact is enhanced”.23 In the 
case of the deadlines and the identifi cation of an ex-
cessive defi cit, the special circumstances that have to 
be taken into account seem to be designed to escape 
enforcement rather than to enhance it. In any case, 
introducing them does not improve fi scal discipline in 
Europe but unnecessarily complicates the Pact.
Interestingly, while mentioning every step in the EDP, 
including less important issues such as the reconfi r-
mation of the Commission’s role in preparing a report 
on the existence of an excessive defi cit in a Member 
State, the Council Report devotes no attention at all 
20 European Commission, op. cit.
21 C. H e f e k e r : Will a Revised Stability Pact Improve Fiscal Policy 
in Europe?, in: INTERECONOMICS, Vol. 40, No. 1, January/February 
2005, pp.17-21.
22 Council Report (2005), p. 16.
23 S. E i j f f i n g e r, op. cit., p. 6.
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to the fi nal step in the EDP – the imposition of sanc-
tions if the ED is not corrected within the prescribed 
timeframe – despite the fact that the roots of much of 
the Pact’s recent trouble and as such most room for 
improvement lie in this area. Cynics may claim that the 
Council has simply recognised that sanctions need 
not to be dealt with, given that the special provisions 
introduced with all the possibilities to escape the EDP 
will make sure that no country ever gets into the situa-
tion of facing sanctions. Whatever the reasons for not 
mentioning sanctions might be, neglecting this crucial 
part of the SGP is a major fl aw in the Council Report. 
Figure 1 illustrates how sanctions fi t into the general 
framework for achieving fi scal discipline. The institu-
tions mentioned on top of the graph are responsible 
for the governance of the fi scal rules, for timely and 
complete communication and – in the case of Member 
States – for national ownership of the SGP rules. Good 
times should be used to consolidate budgets (→ pre-
vention), which is dealt with in the Council Report un-
der “strengthening the preventive arm”. In times where 
a Member State has problems complying with the 
fi scal rules, which will probably but not necessarily oc-
cur during an economic downturn, excessive defi cits 
subject to the EDP should be identifi ed (→ dentifi ca-
tion of ED) and corrected (→ correction of ED), other-
wise sanctions are imposed (→ sanctions). Whereas 
the identifi cation of an excessive defi cit is done by 
the Commission, its correction is fully in the hands of 
Member States whose willingness to comply with the 
recommendations for adjustment crucially depends on 
whether or not the threat of sanctions is credible and 
on the cost of these sanctions. When a country does 
not have to fear any (severe) punishment, it will not feel 
urged to correct its defi cit in a timely manner – with or 
without extended deadlines. In other words, the right 
incentives will just be given in the presence of cred-
ible and costly sanctions. As the example of France 
shows, the problem stems not so much from the lim-
ited ability but primarily from the lack of willingness to 
correct the excessive defi cit as fast as possible. 
Additionally, Figure 1 highlights another reason why 
Member States would be willing to commit them-
selves to prudent policies in good times, a question 
already raised above. The threat of sanctions, if cred-
ible, will give an extra incentive to Member States to 
consolidate their budgets when possible (thus, in 
good times) in order to not get into an EDP in the fi rst 
place. Therefore, credible and suffi ciently high sanc-
tions play a crucial role for both Member States’ com-
mitment to adjust EDs and their willingness to behave 
prudently in good times. This implies that “improving 
the implementation of the SGP” (title of the Report) 
means to a large extent “improving the credibility of 
the threat of sanctions”. The proposition by Buti, Ei-
jffi nger and Franco24 to base the decision of the Coun-
cil on sanctions on a Commission proposal instead of 
a recommendation would be an important step in that 
direction as unanimity is required to move away from 
a proposal. Thus, less discretion is left in the hands of 
the Council, in which the same Ministers of Finance 
responsible for the national budgets and hence the 
excessive defi cits have to decide on sanctions.
General Evaluation
The Council Report on improving the implementa-
tion of the SGP addresses a variety of issues concern-
ing the SGP. In its assessment, especially regarding 
the suggestions aimed at strengthening the preventive 
arm of the Pact proved to be useful. Other problems of 
the current SGP framework that are tackled concern 
the attempt to overcome the excessive uniformity of 
the rules by taking into account debt and sustain-
ability in the defi nition of the MTO and the attempt 
to increase transparency by means of more reliable 
statistics and economic forecasts. Despite these use-
ful elements, the Report contains a lot of suggestions 
that are either unlikely to really lead to improvements 
(see for example the ones aimed at improving govern-
ance) or that will even weaken or complicate the Pact 
without improving fi scal discipline (see e.g. the part on 
24 M. B u t i , S. E i j f f i n g e r, D. F r a n c o , op. cit.
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improving the implementation of the EDP). Besides, 
comparing the actual proposals to the statement in the 
Introduction (see quote on page 1) reveals that some 
suggestions do increase the fl exibility of the rules to a 
certain extent, that is in the new defi nition of the MTO 
depending on debt and sustainability levels, while the 
many possible exceptions for avoiding an EDP are ef-
fectively watering down the stringency of the 3% ref-
erence value. In this respect, the Council Report does 
not even keep up with its own declared objectives. 
One of the main fl aws of the Report is that it dis-
regards the core issue of making the SGP rules more 
effective by (non-partisan) enforcement, especially 
regarding the imposition of sanctions. Member States’ 
commitment to comply with the fi scal rules also in 
bad times can be ensured when non-compliance is 
rather probable and costly and thus undesirable. In 
this context, the reputational costs for a Member State 
of being in the EDP or having to pay fi nes are often put 
forward as a deterrent for a country to run into exces-
sive defi cits. These reputational costs could certainly 
play a role for countries that have never had an ex-
cessive defi cit before. However, once a country is re-
peatedly breaching the rules, its reputational cost will 
diminish. Therefore, imposing sanctions on a Member 
State with a continuing excessive defi cit is the only ef-
fective tool to give the right incentives towards fi scal 
discipline. In contrast, the proposals put forward by 
the Council Report seem to be characterised by an 
averseness to punishing any country. They largely rely 
on the hope that “national ownership” and “renewed 
commitments” will do the trick. “National ownership” 
seems to be the new trendy remedy for failed commit-
ments, both with respect to the Lisbon Agenda and 
the SGP. Time will reveal whether the newly acquired 
prominent role of these terms in the European jargon 
is justifi ed. 
This leaves one question: why would “renewed 
commitments” to fi scal discipline work better than 
the original ones of a few years ago? If enforcement 
is not enhanced, they simply won’t. The belief that the 
suggestions made in the Council Report will be a big 
step forward is thus heavily based on the assumption 
that over recent years governments have become a 
lot more credible in their “renewed commitments”, 
even when facing virtually no negative consequences 
for breaking them. In this case, a simple and credible 
commitment to fi scal discipline in EMU would have 
been suffi cient. This did not prove to be feasible un-
der the present circumstances. Europe is waiting for 
renewed leadership within the large countries!
